Professor Sepe's areas of expertise include business organizations, corporate finance, contract theory, and law and economics. His scholarship focuses on corporate governance, corporate finance, and the theory of institutions. He holds doctoral degrees in both law and economics. Professor Sepe practiced banking and finance law at Clifford Chance, an international law firm based in London, and worked as an investment banker at Fortress Investment Group in London and New York.
SSRN Published Papers
- CEO Pay Redux, 96 Texas Law Review 205 (2017).
- Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 Journal of Financial Economics 422 (2017).
- Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 Minnesota Law Review 1377 (2017).
- Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 Northwestern University Law Review 727 (2016).
- The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 Stanford Law Review 67 (2016).
- Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation and Competition, 100 Cornell Law Review 655 (2015).
- Disentangling Liberalization and Privatization Policies: Is There a Political Trade-Off?, 42 Journal of Comparative Economics 1033 (2014).
- Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations, 102 Georgetown Law Journal 413 (2014).
- Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 Washington University Law Review 309 (2013).
- Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 189 (2011).
- Complete List of Publications
Ph.D. (Economics) Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France
J.S.D. Yale Law School
M.Sc. (Financial Economics) Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse (France)
Ph.D (Law and Economics) University of Siena, Siena (Italy)
LL.M. Yale Law School
Laurea in Giurisprudenza (J.D. ) LUISS University, Rome (Italy)